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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The dynamic process of ground contamination after a major nuclear accident is modelled,
and the system is then extended to include the transient equations describing the three
broad countermeasures: food bans, remediation and population movement (relocation and
repopulation). Countermeasures are assumed to be applicable once the deposition period
has  ended and surface contamination measurements have stabilised. A value function is
constructed to account for the major economic factors, including allowance for the detri-
mental effect on human health of radiation exposure. The principle of optimality is then
applied by requiring the value function to satisfy the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman partial differ-
ential equation, yielding an economically optimal combination of the countermeasures at
any given moment of time within the recovery period. A classiﬁcation into Broad Strategies
is  made in order to explore the similarities in structure of optimal strategies for wide ranges
of  economic parameter values. Population relocation forms no part of any optimal strategy
in  the Base Case (or Case I) as parameters are varied over a wide range. Strategies incorporat-
ing  relocation have a low probability of being optimal even in the low-probability sensitivity
studies of Case II, where relocation is imposed immediately the accident happens, and Case
III,  where the Base Case assumption is reversed of lower economic productivity awaiting
those moving from the original to the new area. It is concluded that relocation is almost
certain to be a less than optimal response after a great many large-scale nuclear accidents.©  2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Institution of Chemical
Engineers. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/).
to provide an estimate of the likely consequences and cost of an acci-.  Introduction
robabilistic safety assessments (PSAs) have been developed exten-
ively over the last 40 years to estimate the risks associated with a
uclear facility. These assessments are typically split into three “lev-
ls”, with Level-1 PSAs aiming ﬁrst to determine the various fault
odes that can occur within a reactor and then to assign a probability
o each of these events happening. Level-2 PSAs build on the results of
hose at Level-1 to estimate the quantities of radioactive materials (the
source term”) released from the site under the various accident sce-
arios. A Level-3 PSA calculates off-site consequences using the resultsroduced by a Level-2 PSA.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: Paul.Johnson-2@manchester.ac.uk (P. Johnson).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2017.08.022
957-5820/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of 
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).An example of a modern Level-3 PSA is Public Health England’s
Probabilistic Accident Consequence Evaluation or PACE code (Charnock
et al., 2013). It estimates the size, number, or extent of the accident
consequences stemming from the release of radioactivity, including
the number of people evacuated or sheltered, the number affected by
immediate and latent health effects, and the amount of agricultural
production restricted. The COCO-2 model (Higgins et al., 2008), included
in PACE as a sub-program, can then estimate the economic costs of the
predicted consequences.
The PACE/COCO-2 combination has been used (Ashley et al., 2017)dent at an imaginary nuclear reactor sited on the South Downs in
Institution of Chemical Engineers. This is an open access article
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Fig. 1 – The deposition layer of a speciﬁc radionuclide and
the vegetation growing on that area.the UK. After ﬁrst specifying the source term and two countermea-
sure regimes and then applying historic probability distributions for
meteorological conditions, it was possible to generate probability dis-
tributions for consequences. COCO-2’s detailed data on the economy of
southern England is able to convert these into corresponding distribu-
tions for economic cost, allowing representative values such as mean
and median to be found.
A feature of such models is that they require the user to select
one or a small number of particular strategies for which they can per-
form the relevant cost calculations, in considerable detail in the case of
PACE/COCO-2. Finding the best strategy would require the programme
suite to be run to evaluate each possible strategy. Since each strat-
egy will involve several components, a great number of computer runs
would be needed to give satisfactory coverage of the decision space,
after which the strategy that was in some sense optimal might be
selected.
The approach taken in this study is different and complementary.
This paper develops a tool for managing the aftermath of a major
nuclear accident that is presumed to have occurred by dividing the
potential countermeasures available to the authorities into just 3 broad
categories: food bans, remediation and population movement, with
the last covering both relocation and repopulation. By allowing for the
dynamics of not only the radioactivity deposition and decay but also of
each of the countermeasures, the application of optimal control tech-
niques permits the determination of which strategy, out of the huge
range of possible strategies, will be economically optimal. The strat-
egy will thus involve not only the extent to which countermeasures
should be pursued but also specify when each should be initiated or
terminated.
The model is developed for a single location, which might be a town,
a village or a speciﬁed area, and it is assumed that no countermeasure
will be applied until the end of the deposition period. At this point it
is assumed that the decision maker will have measurements of the
level of surface contamination (Bq m−2) available, and will thus be in
a position to make well-informed decisions. It is accepted that some
precautionary decisions may have been made before the end of the
deposition period, especially if deposition continues over some length
of time. Such decisions are in principle reversible. As an example, Sec-
tion 7 examines the case where a decision to relocate is made during
the period of deposition; it will be shown that, for some cost combina-
tions, the optimal policy requires the decision to be countermanded by
initiating repopulation immediately after the deposition period ends.
The optimal strategy may be identiﬁed by invoking Bellman’s prin-
ciple of optimality, which states that an optimal sequence of decisions
in a multistage decision process has the property that, whatever the
initial state and decisions, the remaining decisions must constitute
an optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from the ﬁrst
decisions (Bellman, 1956, 1957). Early applications were in the ﬁeld
of control engineering (Bellman, 1961), but the approach has now
been adopted in the ﬁelds of mathematical ﬁnance (Dixit and Pindyck,
1994), operational research and economics. The principle of optimality
is embodied in the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) partial differential
equation when it is applied to continuous-time optimization problems.
The paper begins by deriving a detailed model for the dynamics of
the radioactive fallout at the single location, which leads to a ﬁrst-order
differential equation in the radioactivity concentration (Section 2). The
state and control variables are presented in Section 3, while Section
4 introduces the value function and the associated HJB partial differ-
ential equation that constitutes a sufﬁcient condition for optimality.
Section 5 describes the scaling of the equations and the generalisation
of the solution using non-dimensional groups. Section 6 shows how the
optimal strategies may be categorised into classes or “Broad Strategies”
to bring out the commonalities. Then Section 7 presents the results for
the case of a nuclear reactor accident distributing radionuclides into
the environment on a scale comparable to the release caused by the
accident at Fukushima Daiichi in 2011. Broad Strategies are described
for ranges of costs and revenues for a Base Case (or Case I) and for
the two variants used as sensitivity studies: (i) where pre-relocation isassumed to have occurred (i.e. relocation before the end of the deposi-
tion period) and (ii) where relocation to a different locality increases theeconomic productivity of those relocated. Section 8 lists and discusses
the main modelling simpliﬁcations. Section 9 discusses the method
and its ﬁndings, while Section 10 gives conclusions.
2.  Modelling
Thomas (1999, Introduction) has suggested that:
“The major task facing the control engineer working in
the process industries is the detailed understanding of the
physical processes occurring on the plant and the codiﬁca-
tion of this understanding into a consistent and complete
set of descriptive equations.”
and it is clear that the same principle pertains when the
control is to be applied not to a chemical plant but to the envi-
ronment surrounding a nuclear power plant after a very large
accident involving a signiﬁcant release of nuclear contami-
nation. This Section details the modelling that will underpin
the design of the controls that will achieve the best outcome
for the people living nearby. The underlying dynamic model
is thus made transparent to the interested reader, who may
then check its inherent limits.
The physical modelling described in this section feeds into
Yumashev and Johnson (2017), where their Eq. (1) is derived
as Eq. (38) in this paper, while their Eq. (2) is derived here as
Eq. (30). Meanwhile the results of the economic costing model
described in Yumashev and Johnson (2017) are used in Section
4 of this paper. The two articles, which were written in parallel,
may thus be seen as complementary companion papers.
2.1.  The  deposition  of  radioactive  fallout  and  the
harvesting  of  vegetation
Consider an agricultural surface of area, A (m2), subject to a
time-varying deposition rate, WDi (kg year−1), of radionuclide,
i, of atomic weight, i, assumed spread evenly in a thin surface
layer of mass, MSi (t), over the area. The system that needs to
be considered is illustrated in Fig. 1.
After the radionuclide is deposited onto the surface layer,
some of that radionuclide will be taken up by the vegetation
growing through the surface. For simplicity, it will be assumed
that the vegetation is in a state of equilibrium with the surface
layer of the radionuclide at all times. Hence the mass fraction
of the radionuclide in the vegetation, fVi, may be taken to be
proportional to the ratio of the mass of radionuclide, i, con-
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aained in the surface layer to the total mass, MSi + ME, of soil
own to the depth of the roots, D:
Vi =
MVi
MV
= ki
MSi
MSi + ME
≈ ki
MSi
ME
(1)
here MV is the total mass of vegetation (kg), MVi is the mass
f the radionuclide, i, in the vegetation (kg), ME is the mass
f soil (earth) down to root-depth, D, and ki is the constant
f proportionality. It is reasonable to assume that the mass
f soil will be very much greater than the mass of radioactive
ontaminant in the surface layer: ME  MSi, and this explains
he last step in Eq. (1).
The total mass of radionuclide, i, in the surface layer and
n the vegetation is then,
Mi = MSi + MVi
= MSi + ki
MV
ME
MSi
= MSi
(
1 + ki
MV
ME
) (2)
here Eq. (1) has been used in the second line. Hence,
Si =
Mi
1 + ki MVME
(3)
nd so,
Vi = ki
1
1 + ki MVME
Mi
ME
(4)
Since the mass of vegetation will be much less than the
ass of soil to the depth of that vegetation’s roots, we know
hat MV/ME  1. Even in cases where the radioactive com-
onent is concentrated in the vegetation, the constant of
roportionality, ki, can be expected to be of the same order
s unity or less. Hence we may conclude that 1 + kiMV/ME ≈
. Moreover, ME = EDA, where E is the density of the soil
kg m−2). Hence we  may rewrite Eq. (4) as:
Vi =
ki
EDA
Mi = ai
Mi
A
(5)
here
i =
ki
ED
= kiA
EAD
= kiA
ME
× Msi
Msi
= kiMsi/ME
Msi/A
= MVi/MV
Msi/A
(6)
n which use has been made of Eq. (1) in the last step. ai
m2 kg−1) may be interpreted as the ratio of the mass fraction
f radionuclide i in the vegetation to the surface contamina-
ion with radionuclide i (kg m−2).
Carrying out a mass balance on radionuclide, i, in the sur-
ace layer and in the vegetation gives:
dMi
dt
= WDi − fViWH − iMi (7)
here WH is the harvesting rate of the vegetation (kg s−1)
including by animals feeding on the vegetation) and  iMi is
he rate of decay of radionuclide, i, (kg s−1). This formula-
ion neglects by design the effects of ploughing, seen as a
emedial measure, but it also neglects the diffusion of the
adionuclide deeper into the soil through natural processes
nd the gradual dissolution and dispersion of soluble radionu-clide compounds. Hence it will tend to be pessimistic in the
sense that the radioactivity will be assumed to stay longer in
man’s environment than may be the case in the real situa-
tion. For example Robison et al. (2003) and Paller et al. (2014)
report that while the physical half-life of caesium-137 is 30
years, its half-life in the environment may be signiﬁcantly
lower. Their studies, based on measurements in the Marshall
Islands in the one case and on the Savannah River site in the
USA in the other, produces various estimates for the effec-
tive half-life depending on the environmental medium under
consideration, from less than 9 years up to a maximum of 17
years. Work on Chernobyl post-dating Lochard and Schneider
(1992) suggests that the effective half-life of 137Cs for use in
calculating external dose is 18.8 years, while the value to be
used in calculations of internal dose should be 23 years in
the case of mushrooms but 15 years for general agricultural
products (Jacob et al., 2009). The radioactivity is disappearing
from man’s environment roughly twice as quickly as through
radioactive delay alone.
2.2.  Radioactive  decay  and  the  radioactivity  in
Becquerel
The decay coefﬁcient,  i, may be related to the half-life, t
(i)
1/2,
of radionuclide, i, as follows. In the absence of deposition and
harvesting, Eq. (7) would take the form:
dMi
dt
+ iMi = 0 (8)
which may be integrated with respect to time to give,
ln
Mi
Mi0
= −i (t − t0) (9)
When t − t0 = t(i)1/2, then ln Mi/Mi0 = ln (1/2) = − ln 2, and
substituting these expressions into Eq. (9) gives the desired
relationship:
i =
ln 2
t
(i)
1/2
(10)
When a mass, ıMi (kg), of radionuclide, i, decays by nuclear
disintegration, then ıM∗
i
= ıMi/i kg-atoms are lost, where i
is the atomic weight of radionuclide, i. Thus the number of
atoms of radionuclide, i, that are lost by nuclear disintegration
will be:
−NAkıM∗i = −
NAk
i
ıMi (11)
where NAk = 6.023 × 1026 is Avogadro’s constant ×1000, which
is the number of atoms in a kilogram-atom, and the minus
sign is used to convert the reduction in mass into a positive
number. If these atoms are lost in a time, ıt, then the average
rate of disintegration of atoms over that time will be:
−NAk
i
ıMi
ıt
(12)
As ıt → 0, this expression will give the instantaneous rate
of disintegration of radionuclide, i, ˇi(Bq), where 1 Bq = 1 dis-
integration per second andˇi = −
NAk
i
dMi
dt
(13)
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radioactivity  in  Bq
Eq. (13) may now be combined with Eq. (8) to give the radioac-
tivity in Bq of the mass, Mi (kg), of radionuclide, i, in the surface
layer and in vegetation:
ˇi = i
NAk
i
Mi (14)
Clearly this mass may be deduced if the radioactivity in Bq is
known:
Mi =
i
iNAk
ˇi (15)
Eq. (15) may be used to give another interpretation of the
coefﬁcient, ai, as a radioactive transfer coefﬁcient from soil to
food for radionuclide, i. Substituting Eq. (15) into Eq. (6) gives:
ai =
MVi/MV
Msi/A
= iˇVi(iNAk)
−1/MV
iˇsi(iNAk)
−1/A
= ˇVi/MV
ˇsi/A
(16)
where ˇVi/MV is the speciﬁc radioactivity in the vegetation
(Bq kg−1), while ˇsi/A is the speciﬁc surface radioactivity of the
surface deposition (Bq m−2).
Eq. (15) may be extended by differentiation, where, since  i,
i and NAk are all constants,
dMi
dt
= i
iNAk
dˇi
dt
(17)
2.4.  The  permitted  rate  of  harvesting  of  vegetation,
WH
Harvesting is taken to have a pre-accident level, W(0)H (kg s
−1).
The population occupying the area before the accident is p0,
but the population at a later point will be p, which may be lower
if relocation measures are introduced. As an approximation,
the maximum harvesting rate after the deposition is taken
to be proportional to the manpower available in the region at
time, t, after the nuclear accident:
WH max (t) = p (t)
p0
W
(0)
H (18)
while the actual harvesting rate needs to allow for possible
agricultural restrictions.
Let the Government permit a fraction of land, , in a
restricted area to be used in agriculture, where 0 ≤  ≤ 1. The
harvest rate, WH (t), will be similarly constrained by , so that,
WH (t) = WH max (t) = p (t)
p0
W
(0)
H (19)
where the ﬁnal step follows from Eq. (18).
2.5.  The  mass  balance  and  radioactivity  balance  on
the surface  layer  and  its  vegetation  cover
Eq. (7) may be written:dMi
dt
= WDi − WHi − iMi (20)where
WHi = fViWH (21)
Applying Eqs. (5) and then (19) to Eq. (21) produces
WHi = ai
WH
A
Mi = ai
p
p0
W
(0)
H
A
Mi = aim0
p
p0
Mi (22)
where m0 = W(0)H /A is the mass ﬂux (kg s−1 m−2) for harvested
vegetation at the pre-accident level. Deﬁning the speciﬁc agri-
cultural extraction rate, ˛i, for radionuclide i as:
˛i = aim0 (23)
it is clear that ˛i (s−1) is mapped into the range 0–˛i0 = aim0 as
 moves from 0 (complete restriction) to 1 (no restriction). The
Government restrictions could also be imposed by varying the
levels of the agricultural yield, m, (the mass ﬂux for harvested
vegetation) between 0 and its maximum pre-accident value,
m0, which has exactly the same effect on ˛i as the restrictions
on .
Thus Eq. (20) may be rewritten as:
dMi
dt
= WDi −
(
˛i
p
p0
+ i
)
Mi (24)
Substituting from Eqs. (15) and (17) converts the mass bal-
ance into a radioactivity balance:
i
iNAk
dˇi
dt
= WDi −
(
˛i
p
p0
+ i
)
i
iNAk
ˇi (25)
Dividing throughout by iiNAk , gives:
dˇi
dt
= iNAk
mi
WDi −
(
˛i
p
p0
+ i
)
ˇi (26)
The analysis to this point has been for an area of extent, A
m2. If the speciﬁc surface radioactivity, Bi (Bq m−2), is reason-
ably uniform over the area, then:
ˇi = ABi (27)
Substituting for ˇi from Eq. (27) and its differential, dˇi/dt =
AdBi/dt,  into Eq. (26) gives:
A
dBi
dt
= iNAk
i
WDi −
(
˛i
p
p0
+ i
)
ABi (28)
or:
dBi
dt
= iNAk
i
WDi
A
−
(
˛i
p
p0
+ i
)
Bi
= iNAk
i
qi −
(
˛i
p
p0
+ i
)
Bi
(29)
where qi = WDi/A is the deposition rate of radionuclide, i, per
unit area (kg s−1 m−2).
The instantaneous external or “ground-shine” dose, ri (t)
(Sv s−1), for radionuclide, i, is proportional to the rate of disin-
tegration:ri = cBi (30)
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Fig. 2 – Relocation from the vicinity of Chernobyl nuclearhere c is a constant that depends on the energy of disinte-
ration.
The term, ˛iBip/p0 represents the transfer of radioactiv-
ty from unit agricultural area into the food chain. Assuming,
onservatively, complete consumption by humans of all agri-
ultural products, the collective internal dose rate, r(int )
i
, may
e calculated as ˛ieBip/p0, where e is the ingestion coefﬁcient,
aking the value e = 1.3 × 10−8 Sv Bq−1 when the radionuclide
s 137Cs (Field, 2011), the radionuclide that dominates doses
fter a few years. Using Eq. (30), the collective internal dose
ate from radionuclide, i, may therefore be calculated in terms
f the external dose, ri, as:
(int )
i
= ˛ie
p
p0
Bi = ˛ie
p
p0
ri
c
= ˛i
0
pri (31)
here
0 = c  p0
e
(32)
We  note that according to these equations, the collective
nternal dose rate received along the entire food chain is linked
o the original and remaining population of the contaminated
egion where the food is produced.
.  Control  variables,  state  variables  and
tate  equations
he radionuclides of principal interest, because of their con-
ribution both to external and internal dose via the food
hain, are the caesium isotopes, 134Cs (t1/2 = 2.1 year) and 137Cs
t1/2 = 30.2 year), with 137Cs dominating after a few years.
he approach taken in this section is to build a framework
round a single radionuclide so that the subscript, i, used in
ection 2 for generality, will be dropped henceforth. (It is rel-
tively straightforward to model multiple radionuclides, as
hown in Yumashev and Johnson (2017, additional material).
lternatively, a composite approximation to the two caesium
sotopes, 134Cs and 137Cs, could be used to cover the ﬁrst few
ears.)
It is assumed that the Government in whose territory the
uclear reactor accident occurs will have 3 control variables
t its disposal:
 The target population level, pc, in the affected area. The
range for pc is 0 ≤ pc ≤ p0 where p0 is the number of people
living in the affected area when the accident happens. The
population is assumed to follow this target with ﬁrst-order
dynamics:
dp
dt
= −ˇ (p − pc)
⎧⎨
⎩
 ˇ = ˇ−whenp > pc
 ˇ = ˇ+whenp < pc
(33)
eﬂecting the assumption that the Government has the means
oth to relocate and also to return population.
 The speciﬁc agricultural extraction rate of radioactivity, ˛,
given by Eq. (23), the range of which is 0 ≤  ˛ ≤ ˛0, where
 ˛ = ∗am0, with 0 ≤∗  ≤ 1 representing the range of restrictions
on harvestable land, where ∗= 1 implies no restriction while
∗= 0 means a complete food ban. The remediation rate, ∗, where 0 ≤ ∗ ≤ ∗0. ∗  = 0 corresponds
to no remediation, while a positive value of ∗: ∗  = b > 0 impliespower plant in 1986.
that radioactive contamination is being removed from the
surface layer at a rate proportional to the mass, M,  of
contaminant present, with the constant of proportionality
being b. Meanwhile ∗0 is the highest possible rate of reme-
diation based on the available technology. Thus the rate of
change of contaminant mass due to remediation, dM(∗)/dt,
is given by:
dM(∗)
dt
= −∗M (34)
By Eqs. (15), (17) and (27), this is equivalent to:
dB(∗)
dt
= −∗B (35)
Substituting Eqs. (35) and (30) into Eq. (29) gives, after
omitting the subscript, i, the following ﬁrst-order differential
equation in dose rate, r:
dr
dt
= c NAk

q −
(
˛
p
p0
+  + ∗
)
r (36)
The duration of deposition, TD, will be small compared with
the time constants associated with radioactive decay of the
isotopes of principal interest and with the countermeasures,
the substantial implementation of which may take months.
For example the large areas and populations involved meant
that the 1986 relocation after the Chernobyl accident took from
April to September to complete. See Fig. 2, which is based on
Table 20 of UNSCEAR (2000). Hence we may represent the depo-
sition as happening rapidly enough to be accounted for by the
initial condition at t = 0 for the dose rate, r:
r (0) = r0 = c NAk

0∫
t=−TD
q (t)dt (37)
with Eq. (36) thus being transformed into the decay and
removal process:
dr
dt
= −
(
˛
p
p0
+  + ∗
)
r (38)
The differential Eqs. (33) and (38) represent the dynamics
of the population, p, and the dose rate, r, and describe the sys-
tem that the Government will control by adjusting the control
68  Process Safety and Environmental Protection 1 1 2 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 63–76variables, pc, ∗  and ˛. In the parlance of control engineering,
the state vector, x, is given by:
x (t) =
[
p (t)
r (t)
]
(39)
while the control vector, u, is given by:
u (t) =
⎡
⎢⎣
pc (t)
∗ (t)
˛ (t)
⎤
⎥⎦ (40)
Eqs. (33) and (38) constitute the state equations. The
derivation of parameter values is described in Yumashev and
Johnson (2017).
4.  The  value  function  and  optimal  control
The total ﬂow, F (£ year−1 m−2), of economic value from the
affected area will depend on the population present and on
the radiation dose and will vary with time: F = F (p, r, t). The
function, F, has the form:
F (p, r, t) = −Fr rp
[
1 + ˛
0
]
− F · (p0 − p) − Fd p0
− F˛ · (˛0p0 − ˛p)  Fˇ± |
dp
dt
|
ˇ
− F∗∗  (41)
where the coefﬁcients, Fz, z = r, d, ˛, ˇ± and ∗, are posi-
tive. Derivations of their values and that of F are given in
Yumashev and Johnson (2017). The terms on the right-hand
side of Eq. (41) represent, in order left to right:
• The health costs from external dose (ground shine) and
from contaminated produce,
• The difference in productivity between the old (contami-
nated) and new locations for the displaced people,
• The maximum disruption cost at the old location,
• The revenue from the agricultural produce grown at the old
location,
• The relocation/repopulation costs,
• The remediation costs.
The population differential, |dp/dt|ˇ, covers population move-
ment following Government action, and hence will not include
voluntary relocation.
It is desired to maximize the value coming from the
affected area up to some time horizon, T, which is assumed
to be set by the Government or regulators and may be deﬁned
as a signiﬁcant fraction (1⁄3, ½ . . .)  of the half-life of 137Cs. For
the medium term analysis of this paper, the time horizon, T,
has been set as 15 years. The value, V, is then the integral of
the economic ﬂow, F, with future contributions reduced by a
discount rate, ε:V (p, r, t, T) =
T∫
t′=t
F (p (t′) , r (t′) , t′) e−ε(t
′−t)dt′ + VT (42)
whereVT = V|t=T = max
pc,∗,˛
∞∫
t′=T
F (p (t′) , r (t′) , t′) |{pc,∗,}=fixede−ε(t
′−t)dt′
(43)
is the ﬁnal condition corresponding to the optimal perpetual
state with ﬁxed controls. Following the principle of optimality
(Bellman, 1956), V, must satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
partial differential equation:
∂V
∂t
+ max
pc,∗,˛
[
−ˇ (p − pc) ∂V
∂p
−
(
˛
p
p0
+  + ∗
)
r
∂V
∂r
]
= 0 − εV + F (p, r, t) (44)
The optimal paths, p∗ (t) and r∗ (t), for the population and
radiation dose respectively may be found by integrating the
state equations, Eqs. (33) and (38), from the relevant initial
conditions and with the optimal solutions for the control vari-
ables, pc, ∗ and ˛, in the state space (p, r, t) obtained from Eqs.
(43) and (44).
The inherent difﬁculty of ﬁnding the optimal solutions for
the three control variables is reduced considerably by the lin-
ear, ﬁrst-order nature of the state equations, which means
that the optimal control policy may be expected to be binary
(“bang–bang” solutions). This means that the control variables
must take extreme values if optimality is to be achieved. Hence
∗ must take either the value 0 or else ∗0 and similarly  ˛ will be
either 0 or else ˛0. Because of the possibility of both relocation
and repopulation, the control variable, pc, may take one of 3
possible values: pc = 0, pc = p0 and also the intermediate state,
pc = p. The “bang–bang” condition means that, at any instant,
there are only 12 possible combinations of the control variable
values that can be optimal.
The optimal policies for the control variables, pc, ∗  and
 ˛ may be found by integrating Eq. (44) back in time, but
this requires its ﬁnal condition, Vt=T (p, r, t), to be found. For-
tunately closed-form, approximate solutions for this ﬁnal
condition can be obtained for each of the 12 possible, opti-
mal  combinations of the control variable values, provided the
state Eqs. (33) and (38) can be decoupled. This may be done
by adopting the simplifying assumption that the dynamics of
population movement  will be very rapid compared with those
characterizing changes in dose rate. Thus we  may assume,
as far as the radiation dose is concerned, that the population
is in an evolving steady state at all times, a proposition that
can be implemented by replacing p by pc in Eq. (38). Such an
assumption is likely to be reasonable in most cases, since the
time constant of population dynamics is likely to be measured
in days or weeks, while the reduction in radiation, inﬂuenced
heavily ﬁrst by 134Cs decay and later by 137Cs decay, will occur
over years and decades.
Demarcating the three possible values for pc by superscript
i, the two possible values for ∗ by superscript j, and the possi-
bilities for  ˛ by superscript k, the optimal value of V at time, T,
is:
VT (p, r) = max
i,j,k
V|(i,j,k)t=T (p, r) (45)
which requires numerical evaluation for each pair (p, r)
within the state space.The procedure described above for ﬁnding VT (p, r) may  be
reﬁned by applying direct numerical integration to Eq. (42) for
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imes between T and T2 = 3T (say) and then using analytical
olutions to close the condition at T2:
|t=T (p, r) = max
i,j,k
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
T2∫
t′=T
F(i,j,k) (p (t′) , r (t′) , t′) e−ε(t
′−T)dt′ + e−ε(T2−T)
∞∫
t′=T2
F(i,j,k) (p (t′) , r (t′) , t′) e−ε(t
′−T2)dt′
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(46)
ere p (t′) and r(t′) are given by Eqs. (33) and (38), with the
ontrols corresponding to the discrete state (i, j, k) integrated
rom the “initial” conditions, p (T) = p and r (T) = r. The second
ntegral may be approximated by using the relevant simpliﬁed
losed-form expressions based on the values p (T2) and r (T2) at
he tail end of the ﬁrst integral. This provides the appropriate
losure beyond T2, thus speeding up the computations whilst
etaining a high degree of accuracy for the ﬁnal condition.
.  Scaling  and  the  use  of  non-dimensional
roups
he partial differential Eq. (44) may be scaled and non-
imensional groups introduced in order to establish the
inimal number of independent parameters that provide
nique solutions. Based on the obvious mathematical and eco-
omic properties of the problem, the relevant upper bounds
re used to scale p and r, while a characteristic time, 	, is intro-
uced to scale the rates and times, leading to the following
on-dimensional variables:
p¯ = p
p0
, r¯ = r
r0
, t¯ = t
	
, ¯ˇ  = ˇ	, ¯ = 	 etc. (47)
here the characteristic time, 	, is deﬁned as follows. Consider
he maximum possible external dose, RT, that would have
een received over the optimization interval, T, in the absence
f relocation and if there had been no remedial measures (∗ = 0)
ut a complete food ban (  ˛ = 0):
T =
T∫
t=0
r (t) |ℵ=0, ˛=0dt = r0
1 − e−T

(48)
The characteristic time, 	, and its limiting values are then:
 = RT
r0
= 1  − e
−T

≈
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
T forT  1

1

= t1⁄2 forT 
1

(49)
The non-dimensional scaling of population, p¯ = p/p0,
eans that the solution will hold irrespective of whether p
s regarded as the population of the affected area or the pop-
lation density within the area.
We further introduce the following non-dimensional
ost/revenue groups:
 = 1
RTFr
(
F
ε
+ Fˇ− − Fˇ+
2
)
(50)
ˇ = 1
RTFr
Fˇ− + Fˇ+
2
(51)ℵ = Fℵ
p0RTFr
(52)
˛ = 	 0F˛
RTFr
(53)
where all the lambda parameters: 
, 
ˇ, 
ℵ and 
˛ are scaled
to characteristic health costs from external radiation over the
period. In particular:
•  
 is a general measure of the economic difference between
the old and new locations (including the respective reloca-
tion and repopulation costs);
• 
ˇ measures the average cost of moving;
• 
ℵ measures the cost of remediation; and
• 
˛ measures the amount of revenue coming from the agri-
cultural produce grown at the affected location.
Finally, the scaled value function, V¯, is deﬁned implicitly
by,
V = −(Fdd + Fi) p0 − F˛˛0p0
ε
+ p0RTFRe−ε(T−t)· V¯ (54)
where Fdd p0 is the maximum annual disruption cost at the
new location, Fl p0 is the maximum annual non-radiological
infrastructure depreciation cost following full relocation,
F˛˛0p0 is the pre-accident annual revenue from agriculture
produce, and Fp is the accident-driven difference in annual
productivity between the new and old locations..
6.  Optimal  strategies
6.1.  Classiﬁcation  of  optimal  strategies
The optimal time behaviour of the desired in-situ population,
pc, will correspond to one of 5 broad possibilities:
• No relocation,
• Partial relocation followed by full repopulation,
• Full relocation followed by full repopulation,
• Full relocation and then partial repopulation,
• Full relocation and no repopulation.
This class of possibilities may be given the identifying
variable, Reloc, which will take the values 1–5 respectively.
A similar classiﬁcation is possible for the optimal time
behaviours of remediation rate, ∗, and of the speciﬁc agricul-
tural extraction rate of radioactivity, ˛, where the identifying
variables, Remed and Food, may be assigned. See Table 1.
Any joint optimal strategy for the control variables, pc, ∗
and ˛, may be now classiﬁed as one combination of the broad
strategic components listed in Table 1. It is clear that there will
be 3 × 3 × 5 = 45 possible classes of optimal strategies.
An integer index, S (x),  may be assigned to each class of
optimal strategy, where the index will take a value in the range
1–45, and will depend on the vector of values of the dimension-
less cost/revenue groups and the dimensionless rates:
x =
(

, 
ˇ, 
∗, 
˛, ¯ˇ−, ¯ˇ+, ∗¯0, ¯˛ 0
)
(55)
that deﬁnes a unique setting of the optimisation problem. The
assignment to the classes of the optimal strategies can be
made according to:S (x) = Food (x) + 3 × (Remed (x) − 1) + 9 × (Reloc (x) − 1) (56)
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Table 1 – Components of broad strategies. The
alternatives for the population dynamics that are
possible for the pre-relocated cases are shown in the
brackets.
Component strategy
Value of Reloc
No relocation (Immediate full
repopulation)
1
Partial relocation and full repopulation 2
Full relocation and full repopulation
(Delayed full repopulation)
3
Full relocation and partial repopulation
(Delayed partial repopulation)
4
Full relocation and no repopulation (No
repopulation)
5
Value of Remed
No remediation 1
Delayed remediation 2
Early remediation 3
Value of Food
No food ban 1
Temporary food ban 2
Permanent food ban 3
Table 2 – Assigning a unique identiﬁer to each of the 45
classes of optimal strategy.
Food Remed Reloc Broad Strategy, S
1 1 1 1
2 1 1 2
3 1 1 3
1 2 1 4
2 2 1 5
3 2 1 6
1 3 1 7
2 3 1 8
3 3 1 9
1 1 2 10
2 1 2 11
3 1 2 12
1 2 2 13
2 2 2 14
3 2 2 15
1 3 2 16
2 3 2 17
3 3 2 18
1 1 3 19
2 1 3 20
3 1 3 21
1 2 3 22
2 2 3 23
3 2 3 24
1 3 3 25
2 3  3 26
3 3 3 27
1 1 4 28
2 1 4 29
3 1 4 30
1 2 4 31
2 2 4 32
3 2 4 33
1 3 4 34
2 3 4 35
3 3 4 36
1 1 5 37
2 1 5 38
3 1 5 39
1 2 5 40
2 2 5 41
3 2 5 42
1 3 5 43
2 3 5 44
3 3 5 45
Shaded rows correspond to classes of optimal strategy shown in
Fig. 3.as shown in Table 2, where the term, “Broad Strategy”, is
used to signify the class of optimal strategies with index, S.
It is possible to classify reliably any particular optimal strat-
egy into this system by running a sequence of binary checks.
6.2.  The  probability  of  occurrence  of  classes  of  optimal
strategies
The cost structure of the recovery measures will differ depend-
ing on the country in which the accident has occurred, the
location of the reactor relative to local towns or cities, the
agricultural productivity of the surrounding land and so on.
The different cost structures for a similar accident in different
localities will be reﬂected in the dimensionless cost/revenue
groups given in Eqs. (50)–(53), with the components of
the parameters vector, x =
(

, 
ˇ, 
∗, 
˛, ¯ˇ−, ¯ˇ+, ∗¯0, ¯˛ 0
)
, taking
different values for each accident. Since it is not possible to
know in advance which, if any, of the world’s more  than 400
operating reactors is likely to be affected, it is reasonable to
model each component in x with a probability distribution.
Let the scalar probability density for the dimensionless
parameters be f (x),  deﬁned on the relevant state space,
X. Further, let the subset, labelled xn, of dimensionless
costs/revenues, x, give rise to a class of optimal strategies
identiﬁed by S (x : x ∈ xn) = n. The probability of this class of
optimal strategy being appropriate after the nuclear accident
is,
p (S (x  : x ∈ xn)) = p (x ∈ xn) =
∫
x ∈ xn
f (x)d8x (57)
where d8x = d
d
ˇd
∗d
˛d ¯ˇ−d ¯ˇ+d∗¯0d ¯˛ 0. Given the fortu-
nately small number of large scale nuclear accidents that have
occurred worldwide to date, it is clear that there are difﬁ-
culties in ﬁnding the probability density, f (x),  from historical
data. Progress might be made by using economic modelling to
extend the evidence base, but until more  certain knowledge is
available, it is reasonable to use simple probability densities
to model the parameters.To illustrate the procedure for ﬁnding the probability of a
given Broad Strategy, S, assume that the simplest probabil-
ity density applies that is valid over the region deﬁned by
xqmin ≤ xq ≤ xqmax for each component, q = 
, 
ˇ, · · ·,  ¯˛ 0, of the
parameters vector, x, namely the joint uniform density. Now,
f (x) = 1∫
X
d8x
(58)
The subset of parameters, xn, leading to the class of optimal
strategy with the index S (x:x ∈ xn) = n, may be picked out by:
∫
f (x)d8x =
∫
ıK (S (x) −  n) f (x)d8x (59)x ∈ xn X
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there ıK (i − j) is the discrete Kronecker delta function, with
K (i − j) = 1 when i = j and zero otherwise.
Combining Eqs. (57)–(59) gives the discrete probability of
he class of optimal strategy characterised by S (x) = n as:
n = p (S (x  : x ∈ xn)) =
∫
X
ıK (S (x) −  n) d8x∫
X
d8x
(60)
If f (x) is modelled by non-uniform probability distribu-
ions, Eq. (60) will take the form,
n = p (S (x  : x ∈ xn)) =
∫
X
ıK (S (x) −  n) f (x) d8x∫
X
f (x) d8x
(61)
.  Results
onsider a location near a nuclear power plant that has under-
one a major accident and released radioactive material into
he environment. It is possible to ﬁnd a unique optimal strat-
gy that satisﬁes the HJB equation by measuring the surface
adioactivity concentration at the end of the deposition period
nd feeding in the resulting cost/revenue parameters as well
s the characteristic rates needed to evaluate the dimension-
ess groups, x =
(

, 
ˇ, 
∗, 
˛, ¯ˇ−, ¯ˇ+, ∗¯0, ¯˛ 0
)
. In this Section,
owever, we will consider the more  general problem of ﬁnding
he optimal strategy when the surface activity concentration is
iven, but the cost structure is known only to the extent that
he dimensionless cost/revenue parameters are constrained
o lie within the ranges: xqmin ≤ xq ≤ xqmax, q = 
, 
ˇ, · · ·,  ¯˛ 0, as
iscussed in Section 6.2.
A representative surface activity is found by assuming the
otal masses of radionuclides deposited per square metre to
e similar to those found in the vicinity of Fukushima Daiichi
fter the 2011 accident. This leads to speciﬁc surface activities
t time, t = 0, corresponding to the end of the deposition period,
f 200 kBq m−2 for both 134Cs and 137Cs and 720 kBq m−2 of 131I,
otalling 1120 kBq m−2. The short half-life of 131I means that
he speciﬁc surface activity a year later will be dictated by the
resence of the caesium isotopes only and will have dropped
o 337 kBq m−2.
Results are presented for the classes of optimal strategies
erived for the medium term, taken to cover the period from
he end of the deposition period out to T = 15 years. This time
eriod is particularly important as decisions on relocation, the
ost disruptive and potentially most expensive of the possible
ountermeasures, are usually taken during this time.
The NREFS study (NREFS, 2017; Research Councils UK, 2017)
istinguishes between “evacuation”, taken to be short-term
nd followed by return, and “relocation”, taken to be long-term
r even permanent. Evacuation may be in force for only days
r a week or so, allowing for time to establish the extent of the
ccident, after which a decision may be taken on whether or
ot to allow return. Temporary relocation is deﬁned in Ashley
t al. (2017) as implying an enforced period of absence of up
o 3 months, with relocation regarded as permanent if a rec-
mmendation to return cannot be made 3 months after the
ccident. It would certainly seem that resistance to going back
nd problems with a large-scale return are likely to be encoun-
ered once people have stayed away for a year or more,  as inthe cases of the accidents at both Chernobyl and Fukushima
Daiichi.
A further possibility included in this study is “pre-
relocation”, where the decision is made before the end of the
deposition period, not merely to evacuate people as a precau-
tion, but also to move them permanently to a distant new
home. This is considered in Section 7.2, and it is characterised
by the following four alternatives for the population (instead
of the ﬁve options introduced previously):
• Immediate full repopulation,
• Delayed full repopulation,
• Partial repopulation,
• No repopulation.
The time constants associated with relocation, repopula-
tion and remediation are assumed to be:
	ˇ− = ln 2/ˇ− = 1 − 2weeks
	ˇ+ = ln 2/ˇ+ = 3 − 6months
	∗ = ln 2/∗0 = 1.5 − 3 years
(62)
Fig. 2 compares the cumulative total of relocated per-
sons after the Chernobyl accident from Table 20 of UNSCEAR
(2000) with Eq. (33) when pc = 116, 317 and 	ˇ− = 1.5 weeks.
Repopulation is assumed to be a less urgent and hence
slower process (in reality, it well might proceed in stages).
Remediation is also assumed to go more  slowly. Finally, the
characteristic times associated with the process of radia-
tion extraction through food production are in the range
	˛ = ln 2/˛0 = 2000 − 4000 years, corresponding to agricultural
yields roughly between 5 and 10 ton ha−1. These estimates are
based on the available historic data and are described in detail
in Yumashev and Johnson (2017).
The ranges chosen for the 
 parameters are: 
, 
ˇ ∈
[0.5,10] and 
∗, 
˛ ∈ [0.1, 2], values found after considering
Lochard and Schneider (1992), Gillett et al. (2001), Jacob
et al. (2009) and Munro (2012), and assuming the initial radi-
ation levels in the range 5 mSv/year < r0 < 20 mSv/year (see
Yumashev and Johnson, 2017, for the full derivation). The
different ranges reﬂect the fact that characteristic relocation
costs tend to be several times greater than health costs, while
remediation costs and revenues from agricultural produce
tend to be smaller. These estimates are based on approxi-
mately two-fold variations in the cost parameter F ranging
from their estimated minimum to the maximum values.
The characteristic health cost Fr, for example, varies roughly
between £25,000 per manSv and £55,000 per manSv (central
value £40,000), which is based on the Linear-No-Threshold
hypothesis for the effects of radiation on the resulting losses in
life expectancy, and the Willingness to Pay approach to trans-
late these losses into costs (Yumashev and Johnson, 2017).
For all the cases described below we perform 1000 Monte-
Carlo experiments with uniform distributions for the four
characteristic rates ¯ˇ−, ¯ˇ+, ℵ¯0, ¯˛ 0 and log-uniform distribu-
tions for the four cost/revenue groups 
, all deﬁned using the
ranges speciﬁed above. The log-uniform distributions are cho-
sen according to the multiplicative nature of the cost/revenue
groups.
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Fig. 3 – Probability of Broad Strategy, S, for the three cases:
(i) the Base Case (or Case I), (ii) Case II, involving
pre-relocation, and (iii) Case III, where there is a prior
economic beneﬁt from moving,  < 0.7.1.  Base  Case  (or  Case  I)
Economic productivity will normally fall as a result of a forced
movement  to a new location in the same country, certainly
in the short to medium term, because of the disruption that
people will experience. Relocated people are likely to ﬁnd it
hard to obtain the better paid jobs that would indicate higher
economic productivity. In fact, if the people living in the old
location believed that they could earn more  in the new loca-
tion, they might well have moved anyway, before being obliged
to do so in the unlikely event of a nuclear accident. The fact
that they have not done so suggests that their earnings and
productivity would not be increased by moving. Hence in the
Base Case it is assumed that economic productivity is reduced
by moving to the new location, which implies a positive value
for 
: 
 > 0.
For the ranges of the characteristic times and cost/revenue
groups, 
, listed above, only two classes of optimal strategy
emerged from the analysis, namely Broad Strategy 8, with a
probability of 83.7%, and Broad Strategy 7, with a probabil-
ity 16.3%. Both strategies warranted early remediation, with a
temporary food ban being required by Broad Strategy 8 and no
food ban required under Broad Strategy 7. Both Broad Strate-
gies rejected relocation as a policy option.
The fact that relocation is not called for by any optimal
strategy means that any policy calling for relocation for the
Base Case (or Case I) would not be the best.
7.2.  Pre-relocation  is  assumed  to  occur  (Case  II)
In this sensitivity study, the people are assumed to have been
moved out at a very early stage so that the affected area is
empty of people at t = 0: p0 = 0. The relocation costs are now
regarded as “sunk costs” that have been incurred already and
so are not relevant to future decisions.
As in the Base Case, the more  likely situation for economic
productivity at the new location is assumed to pertain, namely
that it is reduced by moving to the new location: 
 > 0. An
incentive is thus provided for returning at least some of the
population to the old location.
5 classes of optimal strategies are now possible, depending
on the position of the parameters, 
, 
ˇ, 
ℵ, 
˛, ¯ˇ−, ¯ˇ+, ℵ¯0 and
¯˛ 0, within their ranges, which are kept the same as in the Base
Case, although the relocation costs are not relevant in this case
since we  assume that the relocation had already taken place
during the early stages.
The class of optimal strategies most likely to be appropriate
when relocation costs are removed is Broad Strategy 26, which
has a probability of 47%. This strategy corresponds to delayed
full repopulation, early remediation and temporary food ban.
The next most likely Broad Strategy, 8, has a probability of
31.6%, and calls for immediate full repopulation, early reme-
diation and temporary food ban. Broad Strategy 7 is invoked
16.3% of the time, which calls for immediate full repopulation,
early remediation and no food ban. Broad Strategy 23 (prob-
ability 2.9%) is similar to Broad Strategy 26 in that it requires
delayed repopulation and temporary food ban, but now the
remediation is also delayed.
Finally, Broad Strategy 39 (1.6%) calls for no repopula-
tion, no remediation and a perpetual food ban, which implies
completely abandoning the original location and justiﬁes the
original (not necessarily optimal) decision to relocate the peo-
ple. This is the only strategy that does so, suggesting that in
most cases it is not economically viable to relocate the peo-ple if this is going to result in lower productivity at the new
location.
7.3.  Economic  productivity  is  increased  by  moving  to
the new  location  (Case  III)
Although it seems prima facie to be unlikely that the produc-
tivity of those obliged to move and relocate within the same
country would increase as a result, this sensitivity study exam-
ines that possibility for completeness. The lambda ranges stay
the same as for the Base Case, except that now, since 
 < 0,
the limits are set as 
 ∈ [−10, −0.5]. All the other parameter
ranges are the same as before.
With this negative range of 
, it is found that the ﬁrst
two classes of optimal strategies, Broad Strategies 8 and 7,
are appropriate for 81.8% and 16.3% of the cases, respectively,
which is very similar to the Base Case. What is different for
the cases with 
 < 0 is that one additional strategy, Broad
Strategy 39, is invoked in 1.9% of the cases, at the expense
of Broad Strategy 8. As noted in Section 7.2, Broad Strategy 39
corresponds to complete abandonment of the area, with a per-
manent food ban, no remediation and relocation of everyone
in the area with no repopulation at any time. Its slightly higher
likelihood relative to the pre-relocated state with 
 > 0 (1.9%
instead of 1.6%) is due to the additional economic disincentive
to move back.
7.4.  Summary  of  the  results
Fig. 3 shows the probabilities of the various possible Broad
Strategies, S, being appropriate under
• The Base Case (or Case I);
• Case II, where pre-relocation has occurred;
• Case III, where economic productivity will be increased by
a move to the new location.
The higher numbered Broad Strategies call for generally
stronger recovery measures and longer periods when the pop-
ulation has to be displaced from the original location, albeit
temporarily. The Broad Strategies appropriate for the Base
Case (S = 7 and S = 8) exclude relocation as an optimal option.
Process Safety and Environmental Protection 1 1 2 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 63–76 73
c
c
r
i
c
a
s
e
a
d
o
B
t
b
w
n
S
i
t
a
t
n
a
o
B
w
c
l
t
o
t
s
p
s
w
b(
O
v
p
u
h
p
c
a
f
8
T
f
i
m
b
c
t
m
o
tThe effective net cost of relocation is lower for the two other
ases examined, which means that relocation has a greater
hance of being a favoured policy option. In the case of pre-
elocation, Case II, the probability of Broad Strategies involving
mmediate full repopulation, the closest equivalent to no relo-
ation in this particular context, is around 48% (strategies S = 7
nd S = 8 combined), compared with 100% no relocation for the
ame two strategies in the Base Case. Meanwhile Broad Strat-
gy 26, which is based on a seemingly balanced and pragmatic
pproach of combining delayed full repopulation, early reme-
iation and temporary food ban, becomes the dominant class
f optimal strategies, invoked just under half (47%) of the time.
road Strategies 23 (similar to 26 but with delayed remedia-
ion) and 39 (abandonment of the affected area) make up the
alance (just under 5% of the cases in total).
Relocation will tend to be incentivised further in the case
here economic productivity will increase after a move to the
ew location (Case III). Now the abandonment option, Broad
trategy 39, increases in probability to just under 2%, which
s marginally higher than the probability of 1.6% obtained for
he same Broad Strategy when there is pre-relocation but no
dditional economic incentive to move (Case II). It can be seen
hat decreasing the economic penalty and increasing the eco-
omic reward for relocation will inﬂuence strategic decisions
way from repopulation and in the direction of abandonment
f the affected area, although the net effect is relatively small.
Concerning the accuracy of the probabilities given for the
road Strategies, it needs to be born in mind that these
ere calculated on the assumption that the non-dimensional
ost/revenue and the non-dimensional rate variables obeyed
og-uniform and uniform probability distributions, respec-
ively. While this is a reasonable assumption in the absence
f more  detailed knowledge, lack of that knowledge means
hat the resulting probability ﬁgures for the optimal strategies
hould be regarded as indicative rather than deﬁnitive.
Given the choice of probability distributions (including the
arameter ranges), capturing the appropriate optimal control
trategies for each of the cases considered in Sections 7.1–7.3
ithin the list of Broad Strategies depends only on the num-
er of realisations for the eight non-dimensional parameters

, 
ˇ, 
ℵ, 
˛, ¯ˇ−, ¯ˇ+, ℵ¯0, ¯˛ 0
)
within their respective ranges.
ne thousand Monte-Carlo experiments are regarded as pro-
iding a sufﬁcient sample size for the purposes of this study.
Hence, for example, the ﬁnding that relocation forms no
art of any optimal strategy in the Base Case is likely to be valid
nless the ratio of the characteristic relocation costs to the
ealth costs turns out to be below the range for 
ˇ used in the
resent calculations. All the optimal strategies found for this
ore case are likely to involve keeping the population in situ,
pplying early remediation and either imposing a temporary
ood ban or no food ban at all.
.  Limitations  of  the  modelling
he system model combines a physical model (deposition of
allout, uptake of radioactivity by the vegetation, direct and
ndirect harvesting, external and internal dose, population
ovement) with an economic model (productivity differences
efore and after relocation, agricultural revenue, relocation
osts, remediation costs and so on). Finkelstein (2006) notes
hat to “treat effectively the complexity of real systems, the
odels used are highly abstract, that is to say they idealise and
mit detail.”, and it is this philosophy that has been applied
o the task in hand.The main idealisations used in the paper are now listed,
together with comments on their consequences:
• The controls are applied after the deposition period has ﬁn-
ished. This would imply in any practical realisation that the
level of fallout would need to be measured soon after the
fallout had ceased in order to set the initial condition for
the model. There is, in principle, no problem in measuring
the degree of fallout using either spatially distributed, static
detectors or moveable measuring instruments (e.g. drones).
Such a recommendation is contained in Waddington et al.
(2017a).
• Uniform spatial distributions are assumed within the region
under examination for radioactivity, for people and for eco-
nomic activity. Clearly the extent of the approximations will
depend on the size of the region and on the mix  of rural and
urban life within the region. There would be no inherent
difﬁculty, however, in employing several models to cover a
large region.
•  The fallout is assumed subject to only two  methods of
removal from man’s environment: via harvesting and via
radioactive decay (Eq. (20)). This omits both remedial
ploughing and also the natural effects that may reduce the
effective half life by 50% or more,  as noted at the end of
Section 2.1. The effect is to make the physical model conser-
vative – in real life the radioactivity in man’s environment
might decrease at a signiﬁcantly faster rate.
• Simple models are used to represent the processes of relo-
cation, repopulation, remediation and the production of
food. The dynamics might be described more  precisely by
nonlinear differential equations, for example, with more
parameter values, perhaps more  accurately deﬁned. How-
ever, the relative simplicity of the system model makes it
convenient to use as a management tool in its current form.
As a general point, it is not desirable to make a model more
complicated than its end-use warrants.
• The models culminate in the representation of both the
number of people in the region and the dose rate by 1st
order differential equations, as described in Sections 2 and
3. This has the effect noted in Section 4 of rendering the
optimal control actions binary or, in control engineering
parlance, “bang–bang”. This is a standard result in con-
trol theory (see, for example, Owens, 1981, Section 6.1.3).
In fact, such a control law is very reasonable for the man-
agement of a homogeneous, relatively small region, where
the avoidance of ambiguity would require a Government
body, or “Gold Commander” in the short term (National
Policing Improvement Agency, 2009), to recommend either
that people stay in situ or leave, for example. More  complex
recommendations could be envisaged (e.g. a recommenda-
tion that people under a speciﬁed age should move away)
but this could well be seen as over-complicated and sub-
ject to individual interpretation in the practical world of real
people with their own opinions.
• The recommendations constituting the control actions are
assumed to be binding on the population, and, by the same
token, voluntary relocation is not allowed for. Some people
might move away under their own volition, of course, and
might not be prepared to return if and when advised to do so.
Hence the assumption requires the Government body either
to have the power to enforce its will or to be trusted by the
population affected well enough for its recommendations
to be followed by the overwhelming bulk of people.
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of neighbouring regions for interdependencies (such as
induced by commuting between regions for work) to have
negligible effect. Non-negligible interdependencies would
lead to an understatement of the economic disruption felt
by the surrounding regions if the population of the region
in question were relocated. Allowing for such dependencies
would tend to increase the calculated incentive for keep-
ing the population in situ, which would reinforce the major
ﬁnding of the model that relocation should be used spar-
ingly.
• No sectoral detail is included in the economic model. In
fact the use of average properties can be expected to give a
good representation when, as here, the control recommen-
dations are binary (on or off) in nature.
• The average cost of moving, as measured by 
ˇ, has been set
to one half of that used in Yumashev and Johnson (2017).
This reduces the disincentive to relocate, but even so no
optimal strategy for the Base Case involves relocation.
• The results apply for initial dose rates lying between
5 and 20 mSv  per year, corresponding approximately to
the 10–20 mSv  year−1 “medium radiation levels” used in
Yumashev and Johnson (2017). For comparison, the 162,700
evacuees from Fukushima Daiichi would have experienced
an average radiation dose of 16 mSv  in the 12 months fol-
lowing the accident if they had stayed in place (Tables
11 and 12 of Waddington et al., 2017a). Within this group
of 162,700 people, 107,200 would have received less than
20 mSv  (average: 4 mSv), while 55,400 would have received
between 25 mSv  and 51 mSv  (average: 39 mSv) in the ﬁrst
year if they had not moved. The higher doses affecting about
a third of the population group lie between the “medium”
and “higher” radiation ranges considered by Yumashev and
Johnson (2017) – the latter consists of the range: 50–100 mSv
year−1. But those authors found that even at the higher
radiation level, the most common optimal Broad Strategies
would involve no relocation in either the Base Case (or Case
I) or Case III.
While the predictions of economic models are known to
be fallible (e.g. Harford, 2014), it is arguable that the very sim-
plicity of the model, as just discussed, is an advantage. Nor
is the model attempting to provide an absolute forecast of
economic prosperity at some future time, but rather the differ-
ence between two scenarios. The output may then be seen as
guidance to a decision maker, who will then be in a better
position to weigh the harm associated with nuclear radia-
tion against the harm the same people will experience if their
economic well being is reduced. It has been shown conclu-
sively (Waddington et al., 2017a) that the decisions taken by
the authorities after both the world’s major nuclear accidents
were poor, apparently driven by fear of radiation exposure to
the exclusion of all other considerations; use of the model
advanced in this paper would provide the essential economic
counterbalance. In this context, it is worth noting that life
expectancy has been found to depend strongly on GDP per
head (Thomas, 2017; Thomas and Waddington, 2017).
The main conclusion from the Monte Carlo simulation runs
was that in the Base Case (or Case I), the recommendation was
against relocation in every case. This is striking because the
result ﬁnds close parallels in the outcomes of studies using
both the J-value (Waddington et al., 2017a) and Public Health
England’s PACE-COCO2 program suite, as will be discussed fur-
ther in the next section.9.  Discussion
The results for the Base Case (or Case I) show that after a major
nuclear accident involving a signiﬁcant release of radioactive
material, it is not economically sensible to move people away
from their homes on a semi-permanent or permanent basis.
The sensitivity studies embodied in Cases II and III are
inherently less plausible. In Case II it is assumed that people
have been moved out of their homes to semi-permanent or
permanent new housing very early on, before the deposition
phase of the accident is complete, with the cost of the relo-
cation discounted as far as future decisions are concerned. In
reality such a rapid, large-scale movement  of people is likely
to be infeasible. Fig. 2, which records the experience at Cher-
nobyl, suggests that such a movement  of people may well
take weeks. There is also the very sizeable problem of pro-
viding new semi-permanent or permanent accommodation
so quickly. Case III is also unlikely, since it assumes that the
economic conditions for the people after relocation will be bet-
ter than those they experienced in their original area. This
poses the question as to why, given these better conditions
elsewhere, those people have not moved already. Essentially
these cases have been included for completeness.
But even in the unlikely Cases II and III, where the disincen-
tives to moving out have been artiﬁcially reduced, immediate
full repopulation is called for in Case II about 50% of the time,
while no relocation is ordered in Case III on 98% of occasions.
The message coming from the study is that permanent
or semi-permanent movement  of people away from areas
affected by nuclear fallout is likely only rarely to be an econom-
ically optimal strategy, even after allowing for health costs.
Early remediation is, by contrast, desirable in just about all
cases. Food bans may well be needed, but they should be tem-
porary.
These quantiﬁed results are based on a model that includes
a good many  simplifying assumptions, as documented in Sec-
tion 8. But although they stand in stark contrast to the ways
in which governments reacted after the big nuclear accidents
at both Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi, the results are
in strong agreement with the ﬁndings of two separate and
diverse studies that formed part of the NREFS project (NREFS,
2017). J-value analysis has shown that the number of people,
335,000, relocated after Chernobyl was too high by a factor
of between 5 and 10, and that it is difﬁcult to justify relo-
cating any of the 160,000 people moved out after Fukushima
Daiichi (Waddington et al., 2017a). J-value analysis has also
endorsed remediation measures instituted in the vicinity of
both Fukushima Daiichi and Chernobyl, in the latter case even
after 20 years (Waddington et al., 2017b). Meanwhile Public
Health England’s PACE-COCO2 program suite has been used
to model an major accident at a ﬁctional nuclear reactor situ-
ated on England’s South Downs, about 2½ miles from Midhurst
in Sussex (Ashley et al., 2017). Here it was found that only
620 people would be expected to need permanent reloca-
tion, even when a very strict return criterion was imposed.
Applied three months into the accident, this criterion stip-
ulated the radiation dose to be received over the following
12 months at the original location should be no more  than
10 mSv,  half the safe-return dose, 20 mSv  year−1 announced
by the Japanese Government after the Fukushima Daiichi acci-
dent (World Nuclear Association, 2017).
The results from this paper are also in line with much
expert opinion over the decades, which has regarded many
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af the measures introduced after Chernobyl as excessive and
robably counterproductive. See, for example, EC/IAEA/WHO
1996), Discussion on Background Paper 6. Even earlier, the
ffectiveness of relocation post 1990 was the subject of a
etailed study carried out by Lochard and Schneider (1992). See
lso Lochard et al. (1992). The work, which started in 1990, was
arried out under contract for the Commission of the European
ommunities (CEC) within the framework of the IAEA Inter-
ational Chernobyl Project. The IAEA was itself responding to
 request from the Soviet Government that an international
roup of experts should be organised to review and evaluate
he measures being taken to assure safe living conditions for
he people continuing to live in the affected areas. Lochard and
chneider recommended against a second mass relocation in
990, but unfortunately this advice was not acted on.
The ﬁrst lesson that the present study holds should be of
alue to future decision makers who  may face the challenge of
oping with a big nuclear accident. It is this: rather than allow-
ng themselves to be inﬂuenced by the precedents of mass
elocation following both the Chernobyl and Fukushima Dai-
chi accidents, such decision makers should realise that such
 response is highly likely to constitute a poor strategy that
ill not serve the interests of the people it is intended to help.
emediation and temporary food bans are more  likely to form
art of the optimal policy.
Further development could see the model and the associ-
ted control recommendations applied to a speciﬁc accident.
his would require a compilation and updating of economic
ata for the areas around nuclear plant, together with the
vailability of instrumentation systems to provide the nec-
ssary measurements of radioactivity levels. The goal would
e to apply the overall system to provide real-time informa-
ion and recommendations to the decision maker facing a big
uclear accident.
0.  Conclusion
he principle has been demonstrated that advanced control
echniques may be used to ﬁnd the optimal mix  and timing of
ountermeasures after a major nuclear accident, where “opti-
al” implies economic optimisation making due allowance
or:
 Health costs resulting from ground shine radiation and con-
taminated food produce,
 Dfferences in productivity between the old (contaminated)
and new locations for people who have been relocated,
 Disruption in productivity as a result of relocation and
repopulation,
 Revenue from the agricultural produce,
 Relocation/repopulation costs,
 Remediation costs.
The method may be applied to a location in the vicinity of
 stricken nuclear power station once the deposition period
as ended and the measurements of surface contamination
ave stabilised. A good system for measuring the radioactiv-
ty levels over a wide area in the vicinity of the nuclear site is
equired. This may be either ﬁxed or movable, possibly imple-
ented using drone technology, but it needs to be established
n advance of any accident.
The model from which the optimal strategy is found is rel-
tively simple in structure, but requires an extensive set ofparameters to characterise regional economic activity, both
near the nuclear power plant and in the area envisaged for
possible relocation. It would be sensible to have estimates of
these parameters available on an ongoing basis for nuclear
sites so that the method could be deployed in a timely fashion
if and when needed.
More study could improve the representation of the
dynamics of the possible countermeasures, which might be
described more  precisely by nonlinear differential equations,
for example, with more  accurately deﬁned parameter values.
However, the relative simplicity of the model makes it conve-
nient to use as a management tool in its current form. As a
general point, it is not desirable to make a model more com-
plicated than its end use warrants.
The values of the parameters near any particular nuclear
power station will obviously vary signiﬁcantly with the coun-
try and region in which the reactor is situated and the
geography of the surrounding area. The study made allowance
for this by regarding the dimensionless economic groupings
and rates as random variables spanning wide ranges. The
choices made for the associated probability distributions are
advanced as reasonable in the absence of further data, but it is
accepted that there must be a degree of residual uncertainty
here. Thus, while it is judged likely that all the possible opti-
mal  strategies have been identiﬁed for each of the scenarios
considered in Section 7, the probability ﬁgures estimated for
the Broad Strategies should be taken as indicative rather than
precise estimates.
It is found that no optimal strategy for the Base Case
involves any degree of relocation. Nor does permanent relo-
cation ﬁgure in the large majority of the optimal strategies
associated with the variant sensitivity scenarios considered,
namely Cases II and III. It is concluded that relocation is almost
certain to be a less than optimal response after many  major
nuclear accidents.
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